Renegotiating Social Citizenship in the Age of Devolution by Simpson, Mark
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: 
M Simpson, ‘Renegotiating social citizenship in the age of devolution’ (2017) 44(4) Journal of Law 
and Society 646 
It has been published in final form at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy1.athensams.net/doi/10.1111/jols.12061/full. This article may be 
used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-
Archiving. 
Renegotiating social citizenship in the 
age of devolution 
ABSTRACT 
The period 2012 to 2016 saw important developments in the role of the UK’s devolved legislatures in 
shaping citizens’ social rights. Near-uniformity in social security is being eroded, with some 
competences devolved to Scotland and Northern Ireland proceeding with limited divergence from 
Great Britain. This turn to regionalisation is linked with dissatisfaction with UK government policy. 
This article examines developments from a social citizenship perspective. Welfare regionalism is a 
challenge to Marshall’s perceived unitary view of citizenship. Yet the emergence of support for 
divergence from differences of perspective on the state’s duty to support citizens’ economic welfare 
and the citizen’s reciprocal obligations emphasises the continued relevance of Marshallian theory. As 
the democratisation of political rights gave birth to social rights in the early 20th century, the 
regionalisation of democratic citizenship has allowed alternative visions for social citizenship to be 
articulated and begin to shape the emerging devolved social security systems.  
INTRODUCTION 
Legislative devolution has brought changes in the social rights of citizens in the UK’s component 
regions.1 However, the maintenance of near-uniformity in social security prior to 2012 meant 
regionalisation of social citizenship remained limited. The Cameron governments, despite the 
Conservative Party’s view of devolution as “constitutional vandalism,”2 would oversee the most 
significant regionalisation of responsibility for income maintenance since the foundation of the 
modern welfare state. This thus-far limited process challenges interpretations of Marshall’s social 
citizenship theory that situate responsibility for citizens’ economic welfare with the nation state.3 
This article suggests divergence can be reconciled with Marshallian citizenship if subnational political 
units hold and pursue different perspectives on the nature of the associated social rights.  
The period between 2012 and 2016 saw Scotland and Northern Ireland take steps towards greater 
regional autonomy in social security Through analysis of political and legal developments, and of 
interviews with policymakers, the article presents empirical evidence that regional differences in 
ideologies of social citizenship provide a partial explanation for this process. Devolved-level elites 
                                                          
1 D Birrell, The impact of devolution on social policy (Bristol: Policy Press, 2009); D Birrell and AM Gray, ‘Social 
policy in the devolved administrations’ in H Bochel and M Powell, The coalition government and social policy: 
restructuring the welfare state (Bristol: Policy Press, 2016) 
2 Conservative Party, Invitation to join the government of Britain: the Conservative manifesto 2010 (London: 
Conservative Party, 2010) 83 
3 G Mooney and C Williams, ‘Forging new “ways of life”? Social policy and nation building in devolved Scotland 
and Wales’ (2006) 26(3) Critical Social Policy 608; M Keating, ‘Social citizenship, solidarity and welfare in 
regionalised and plurinational states’ (2009) 13(5) Citizenship Studies 501 
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have clear concerns with UK Government reforms (not uncontroversial in England) that can appear 
at odds with conceptions of Marshall as an advocate of extensive, largely unconditional welfare 
provision as an engine of greater equality. A combination of concern about UK government policy 
and a desire to use devolution to find a better way underpin a growing welfare regionalism that to a 
large extent transcends the unionist-nationalist divide. Section 1 introduces the Marshallian account 
of the emergence of social citizenship, its link to a minimum standard of living and the challenge 
potentially posed by devolution. This is followed in section 2 by a brief description of the empirical 
study from which the findings flow. Section 3 gives an overview of key social security reforms under 
the Cameron governments, which sections 4 and 5 suggests are at odds with both common 
interpretations of Marshall as favouring a generous welfare state with light-touch conditionality and 
the aspirations of Scottish devolved elites in particular. Section 6 highlights these divergent 
ideologies, and their translation into policy, as a challenge to views of the nation state as the natural 
locus of social citizenship, but argues that, contrary to his depiction as a welfare unionist, this is 
compatible with Marshall’s account of social rights as emerging from the exercise of political rights. 
The conclusion sums up the argument and emphasises the continued relevance of Marshallian 
theory to a decentralising UK. 
1. SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE DEVOLUTION ERA 
Marshall breaks down citizenship into three elements: civil, political and social. The social element 
confers: 
“the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the 
right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being 
according to the standards prevailing in the society.”4 
This core vision of a state’s responsibility to “fulfil normative expectations about how the basic 
requirements of… personal welfare and development can be met,”5 so that citizens can meet their 
basic needs and enjoy a reasonable level of social participation, remains the starting point for much 
academic discussion of social rights. Townsend, lynchpin of the 1960s ‘rediscovery of poverty’, 
defines poverty as “resources… so seriously below… the average” that the individual is “excluded 
from ordinary living patterns, customs and activities.”6  This relative conception of poverty, 
grounded in the principle that economic welfare is compromised by lack of access to the goods, 
services and activities that comprise a normal lifestyle in a society, even if physical necessities are 
within reach,7 has been widely embraced. The European Council and Commission refer to “income… 
so inadequate as to preclude… a standard of living considered acceptable,” encompassing 
                                                          
4 TH Marshall, ‘Citizenship and social class’ in TH Marshall and T Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class 
(London: Pluto, 1992) 8 
5 N Harris, Law in a complex state: complexity in the law and structure of welfare (Oxford: Hart, 2013) 4 
6 P Townsend, Poverty in the United Kingdom (London: Penguin, 1979) 31 
7 D Gordon, ‘The concept and measurement of poverty’ in C Pantazis, D Gordon and R Levitas (eds), Poverty 
and Social Exclusion in Britain (Bristol: Policy Press, 2006) 
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“activities… that are the norm for other people.” 8 Other authors explicitly link poverty to 
“deprivation of social citizenship”9 or “denial of citizenship.” 10 The Europe 2020 strategy11 indicates 
that EU states generally accept responsibility for poverty reduction. 
International law, too, indicates that the citizen has a right not to mere survival, but to be protected 
from falling too far below a normal standard of living. The right to an adequate standard of living  in 
article 11 ICESCR encompasses food and housing that are culturally acceptable as well as physically 
adequate12 and participation in “the everyday life of society.”13  Similarly, the European Committee 
of Social Rights and International Labour Organisation base their assessments of an acceptable 
income on a proportion of typical earnings or income. 14 This approach was also reflected in the 
former UK child poverty legislation, which defined poverty as an income below a minimum 
proportion of the median in the current year, three of the last four years or a benchmark year, or 
insufficient to purchase a list of items deemed necessary for a normal lifestyle.15  
That there is a social element to citizenship seems uncontroversial. The detail of social citizenship is 
more contested. Marshall’s teleology, with civil, political and social citizenship emerging in that 
order, has been criticised as privileging the experience of British males at the expense of other 
societies or social groups in which the rights of citizenship were acquired differently,16 neglecting the 
                                                          
8 Council of the European Union, ‘Joint report by the Commission and the Council on social inclusion’ (7104/04, 
Brussels, 5 March 2004) 8 
9 N Harris, ‘Youth, citizenship and welfare’ (1992) 3 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 175, 177 
10 Fondation Roi Baudouin, ATD Quart Monde Belgique and Union des Villes et Communes belges, Rapport 
général sur la pauvreté (Brussels: Ministre de l’Intégration Sociale, 1994) 394 
11 European Commission, ‘Europe 2020 targets’ (Brussels: European Commission, 2015) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/targets/index_en.htm> 
12 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General comment 12: the right to adequate food 
(article 11)’ (E/C.12/1999/5, Geneva: United Nations, 1999); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, ‘General comment no 4: the right to adequate housing (art. 11 (1) of the Covenant)’ (sixth session, 
1991) (Geneva: United Nations, 1991) 
13 World Bank, ‘World development report 1990: world development indicators’ (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990) 26 
14 International Labour Organisation, ‘Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2007, published 97th ILC session 
(2008): Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102) - United Kingdom’ (Geneva: ILO, 
2007); Committee of Independent Experts, Conclusions XIV-2 vol 1 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1998-2000) 
49-52; European Committee of Social Rights, European Social Charter: conclusions XX-2 (2013) (Great Britain) 
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2014) 18, 22 
15 Child Poverty Act 2010 c9 s2-6; repealed by Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016 c7 s7 
16 T Bottomore, ‘Citizenship and social class, forty years on’ in TH Marshall and T Bottomore, Citizenship and 
Social Class (London: Pluto, 1992); B Siim, ‘Gender and citizenship. problems of exclusion and Inclusion in 
Europe’ (European citizenship: beyond borders across identities, Brussels, April 2000); J Møller and S-E 
Skaaning, ‘Marshall revisited: the sequence of citizenship rights in the 21st century’ (2010) 14(1) Government 
and Opposition 457 
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interdependence of the three elements17 and omitting other potential elements of citizenship.18 
More important when assessing the contemporary meaning of social citizenship is the lack of 
consensus as to what level of economic welfare the state ought to guarantee citizens and the extent 
to which this guarantee should be contingent on the discharge of reciprocal responsibilities. When 
disagreements about these matters occur between tiers of government, a further presumption 
about the social rights of citizenship – that they should be uniform across the state, defined and 
perhaps also realised by central government – can come under pressure. It is this process with which 
the article is chiefly concerned. Empirical findings reveal how political disagreement about the 
standard of living the state ought to support and the conditions it ought to impose underpin a 
challenge to the constitutional division of responsibility for economic welfare, and may in time result 
in regional divergence in the social rights of citizenship. 
2. THE PROJECT: EVOLUTION AND DEVOLUTION OF SOCIAL 
CITIZENSHIP 
The article flows from a socio-legal study of social citizenship in the UK bookended by the Cameron 
governments’ flagship social security Acts: the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and the Welfare Reform 
and Work Act 2016. This period took in Scotland’s independence referendum and subsequent 
renegotiation of its devolution settlement, as well as a protracted political impasse in Northern 
Ireland over the region’s own Welfare Reform Bill that at times appeared to throw into question the 
future of devolution. Law does not exist in isolation from a society and a political system, but serves 
as “an instrument for achieving social justice”19 through its role as governments’ “principal tool 
used… to deliver social and economic policy.”20 Social security law has a particularly strong 
connection to the interpretation of social justice held by the government of the day. However, 
constitutional law is not unaffected. According to the mirror thesis, the vision for social justice 
embodied by the law should reflect the needs and desires of society; but if, in a multinational state, 
the mirror reflects only the dominant region’s (England’s) view of social justice, pressure for greater 
autonomy or independence may result.21 Constitutional upheaval in Scotland and Northern Ireland 
has been intimately linked to political reaction to the UK government’s social security policy and 
underpinning view of social justice. 
                                                          
17 M Lister, ‘“Marshall-ing” social and political citizenship: towards a unified conception of citizenship’ (2005) 
40(4) Government and Opposition 471; E Palmer, Judicial review, socio-economic rights and the Human Rights 
Act (Oxford: Hart, 2007) 
18 AM Rees, ‘TH Marshall and the progress of citizenship’ in M Bulmer and AM Rees (eds), Citizenship today: 
the contemporary relevance of TH Marshall (Routledge, 1996) 13; G Delanty, Citizenship in a global age: 
society, culture and politics (Open University Press, 2000) 18 
19 DJ Galligan, ‘Legal theory and empirical research’ in P Cane and HM Kritzer (eds), The Oxford handbook of 
empirical legal research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 983 
20 M Partington, ‘Empirical legal research and policy-making’ in P Cane and HM Kritzer (eds), The Oxford 
handbook of empirical legal research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 1003;  
21 BZ Tamanaha, ‘Law and society’ in D Patterson (ed), A companion to philosophy of law and legal theory 
(Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) 369 
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The empirical element of the study was concerned with the reshaping of the social rights of 
citizenship through the eyes of devolved elites. Insights were gained into policymakers’ views on UK-
level developments, moves towards greater autonomy in social security and priorities for a nascent 
Scottish or Northern Irish social security system, and the perspectives on a minimum standard of 
living and the relative responsibilities of state and citizen for the citizen’s economic welfare that 
underpin these aspirations. The 36 participants consisted of nine Scottish and nine Northern Irish 
politicians, plus eight Scottish and ten Northern Irish civil servants. Wales was excluded because it 
lacks devolved competence for social security, there are no current proposals for and the Welsh 
government has not advocated devolved competence.22 Politicians included eight unionists, nine 
nationalists and one member of a party neutral on the constitutional question, recruited purposively 
on the basis of current or recent committee roles of relevance to social security, other areas of the 
welfare state or the constitution. Civil servants were drawn from departments or directorates with 
responsibility for social security, other welfare services, equality or finance. Consequently, 
participants were well informed on the relevant issues and potentially in a position to play a part in 
decisions on the division of responsibility for social security or in shaping a future devolved 
approach. Semi-structured interviews were conducted, usually on a one-to-one basis at the 
interviewee’s place of work, with a constant comparative/constructivist grounded method adopted 
for data analysis.23 While the empirical data reflects research participants’ views at a particular point 
in time, the article necessarily examines the significance for social citizenship of subsequent events. 
3. THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP: KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THE CAMERON ERA 
Successive governments have sought to reshape the UK’s social security system in accordance with 
their own ideology of social citizenship or vision for social justice. The Attlee government was 
strongly influenced by the emphasis of the “reluctant collectivist” Beveridge on partnership between 
citizen and state. Following the “rediscovery of poverty,” the “democratic socialists” of subsequent 
Labour governments embarked on a more concerted effort to use the welfare state as a “means of 
engineering a more equal and fair society.” The “New Right” after 1975 was driven by revived 
mistrust of the state and faith in the market combined with scepticism as to whether ‘real’ poverty 
could exist in the modern UK to put in place reforms that, over time, would significantly reduce 
generosity to claimants.24 After 1997, the ‘third way’ tempered emphasis on the individual’s 
                                                          
22 Government of Wales Act 2006 c32 sch 5; Commission on Devolution in Wales, Empowerment and 
responsibility: legislative powers to strengthen Wales (Cardiff: Commission on Devolution in Wales, 2013); 
Welsh Government, ‘Evidence submitted by the Welsh Government to the Commission on Devolution in 
Wales’ (Cardiff: Welsh Government, 2013) 
23 BG Glaser and AL Strauss, The discovery of grounded theory: strategies for qualitative research (New York: 
Aldine, 1967); K Charmaz, Constructing grounded theory: a practical guide through qualitative analysis 
(London: Sage, 2006) 
24 R Lowe, The welfare state in Britain since 1945 (London: Macmillan, 1999) 17-24; see also J Mack and S 
Lansley, Poor Britain (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985); P Pierson, Dismantling the welfare state? 
Regan, Thatcher and the politics of retrenchment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 
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responsibility to meet his or her own needs through paid work with recognition that a “quiet 
redistribution” was necessary to protect some ‘deserving’ groups, notably children, from poverty.25 
The Cameron governments oversaw a further ramping-up of emphasis on paid work alongside a 
reversal of the increases in generosity of 1997 to 2010. The self-imposed imperative of reducing the 
public deficit is not in itself sufficient explanation, as neither all areas of the welfare state nor all 
social groups were equally affected by spending cuts.26 While early policy documents foreground 
apparently pragmatic goals of simplicity, efficiency, “fewer layers of bureaucracy,” “making work 
pay” and “tackling the root causes of poverty,”27 subsequent developments and Ministers’ 
statements reveal a particular understanding of the nature of poverty and the poor that must form 
part of the explanation.28 Although the coalition initially endorsed New Labour’s child poverty 
reduction targets, its promise of “a new approach to child poverty” 29 would birth a deprioritisation 
of income poverty through repeal of the statutory duties in the Child Poverty Act 2010. These 
developments embody a shift in the construction of poverty from a condition primarily characterised 
by lack of income to one mainly characterised by lack of employment. From the perspective of the 
then-Secretary of State, social transfers merely manage the “symptoms” of poverty; the “cause” can 
only be treated by employment30 – a position at odds with the finding that a near-exclusive focus on 
employment as the route out of poverty was incompatible with the achievement of the child poverty 
targets.31 However, this pragmatic explanation for the period’s approach to social security is 
reinforced by a moral perspective according to which “those who do the right thing, who take a full 
time job” should be rewarded;32 those allegedly content to pass their days “sleeping off a life on 
benefits” should not be indulged. 33 
The reforms of 2010 to 2016 tended to reduce the generosity of the social security system. Although 
the flagship replacement of a suite of benefits with universal credit was intended to be revenue 
                                                          
25 R Lister, ‘Doing good by stealth: the politics of poverty and inequality under New Labour’ (2001) 8(2) New 
Economy 65; see also M Adler, ‘Combining welfare-to-work measures with tax credits: a new hybrid approach 
to social security in the United Kingdom’ (2004) 57(2) International Social Security Review 87 
26 N Ellison, ‘The coalition government, public spending and social policy’ in H Bochel and M Powell (eds), The 
coalition government and social policy: restructuring the welfare state (Bristol: Policy Press, 2016) 
27 Department for Work and Pensions, 21st century welfare (Cm 7913, London: DWP, 2010) 1 
28 J Wiggan, ‘Telling stories of 21st century welfare: the UK coalition government and the neoliberal discourse 
of worklessness and dependency’ (2012) 32(3) Critical Social Policy 383; C Pantazis, ‘Policies and discourses of 
poverty during a time of recession and austerity’ (2016) 36(1) Critical Social Policy 3 
29 HM Government, A new approach to child poverty: tackling the causes of disadvantage and transforming 
families’ lives (Cm 8061, London: DWP, 2011) 
30 HM Government, A new approach to child poverty: tackling the causes of disadvantage and transforming 
families’ lives (Cm 8061, London: DWP, 2011) 3 
31 H Reed and J Portes, Understanding the parental employment scenarios necessary to meet the 2020 Child 
Poverty Targets (London: Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission, 2014); see also R Joyce, ‘Child poverty 
in Britain: recent trends and future prospects’ (W15/07, London: IFS, 2014) 
32 I Duncan Smith, ‘Foreword – Secretary of State for Work and Pensions’ in HM Government, A new approach 
to child poverty: tackling the causes of disadvantage and transforming families’ lives (Cm 8061, London: DWP, 
2011) 3 
33 G Osborne, speech (Conservative Party conference, Birmingham, October 2012) 
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neutral, the real or cash value of benefits was reduced by the new household benefit cap,34 
reduction of the local housing allowance,35 extension of the housing benefit size criteria to social 
tenants,36 below-inflation uprating and ultimate freezing of income replacement benefits37 and two-
child limit on the child element of universal credit and tax credits.38 The replacement of disability 
living allowance with the personal independence payment brought more restrictive eligibility 
criteria,39 eligibility periods for contributory employment and support allowance were shortened40 
and jobseeker’s allowance claimants were made subject to tougher conditions, with stiffer penalties 
for non-compliance.41  
In parallel to this reshaping of social citizenship by the UK government came a partial renegotiation 
of the roles of the various tiers of government in the definition and realisation of citizens’ social 
rights. Social security represents a rare field of social policy in which central government had 
retained its predominance after 1998.42 Centralised control began to erode under the coalition, in 
part led by the UK government’s abolition of the discretionary social fund and council tax benefit, 
and devolution of responsibility for their replacements.43 Demand for regional control of other 
benefits came from below, with the Northern Ireland Assembly debating the most significant 
departures yet from provision in Great Britain44 and Scotland’s main political parties advocating 
partial devolution of competence following the 2014 independence referendum.45  
Dissatisfaction with the coalition’s welfare reform agenda was not confined to the devolved 
regions,46 but parties in the devolved administrations were vocal critics. Scotland’s Deputy First 
Minister warned that “the UK government’s pernicious welfare reforms” would drive a significant 
increase in “the number of Scottish children living in poverty.”47 At the introduction of Northern 
Ireland’s Welfare Reform Bill, the chair of the Assembly scrutiny committee called for colleagues to 
“stand up for low income families” by making “fundamental changes” to a draft modelled on the 
                                                          
34 Benefit Cap (Housing Benefit) Regulations 2012 no 2994 reg 2; Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016 c7 s8 
35 Rent Officers (Housing Benefit Functions) Order 1997 no 1984 art 4B 
36 Housing Benefit Regulations 2006 no 213 part 3 
37 Welfare Benefits Up-rating Act 2013 c16; Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016 c7 s11 
38 Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016 c7 s14 
39 N Harris, ‘Welfare reform and the shifting threshold of support for disabled people’ (2014) 77(6) Modern 
Law Review 888 
40 Welfare Reform Act 2012 c5 s51 
41 Jobseeker’s Allowance (Sanctions) (Amendment) Regulations 2012 no 2568 reg 2 
42 D Birrell, The impact of devolution on social policy (Bristol: Policy Press, 2009) 
43 Welfare Reform Act 2012 c5 s33, 70 
44 M Simpson, ‘Developing constitutional principles through firefighting: social security parity in Northern 
Ireland (2015) 22(1) Journal of Social Security Law 31 
45 Smith Commission, Report of the Smith Commission for further devolution of powers to the Scottish 
Parliament (Edinburgh: Smith Commission, 2014) 
46 C Wood, ‘Battling it out on welfare’ (Public Finance, 27 January 2012) 11; J McDonnell, HC deb 20 July 2015 
vol 598 no 36 col 1314 
47 N Sturgeon, ‘Foreword from the Deputy First Minister’ in Scottish Government, Child poverty strategy for 
Scotland: our approach 2014-2017 (Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2014) 3 
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recent Westminster Act.48 In Wales, the Tackling Poverty Minister claimed the UK government was 
“coming for ordinary Welsh people… stepping away from their responsibility to the most vulnerable 
in our society.”49 The inseparability of a hesitant process of decentralisation from reactions to the 
coalition programme will become apparent over subsequent sections. 
4. ‘THE LIFE OF A CIVILISED BEING’: AN ELUSIVE CONSENSUS ON A 
MINIMUM STANDARD OF LIVING 
Defining a minimum acceptable standard of living is no straightforward task. As Marshall 
emphasises, what “the life of a civilised being” looks like at a given time can only be understood with 
reference to “the standards prevailing.”50 Although it is clear that the basic requirements of a normal 
lifestyle in the UK in 2016 include things that previous generations would have considered 
unimaginable luxuries,51 different perspectives exist on what those basic requirements are or what 
income is required to access them. While DWP’s relative poverty line at 60 per cent of median 
income was based on the premise that the poorest households should not fall so far behind the 
“typical” household that they are unable to “take a full part in the activities that social inclusion 
demands,”52 it is possible to argue that income-based poverty lines are “wholly arbitrary.”53 
Arbitrary or not, the former statutory duty on the government to reduce child poverty according to 
the income standards enshrined in the 2010 Act was in keeping with Marshall’s view that “the relief 
of the poor… is among the unqualified objects of public duty”54 and with the right in article 11 
ICESCR and article 27 UNCRC to an adequate standard of living. By its own standard, the UK 
government failed to discharge this ‘unqualified duty’: an interim target for the halving of child 
poverty between 1998-99 and 2010-11 was missed55 and even before their repeal it was apparent 
that the targets for 2020-21 would not be achieved.56 The UK also falls short of international 
standards for poverty alleviation, benefit levels being “manifestly inadequate” to comply with article 
12 ESC (the right to social security) in 2014.57 The conclusion the same year that the state did comply 
with article 13 (the right to social assistance) was questionable then and becomes increasingly 
                                                          
48 A Maskey, ‘Sinn Féin calls for deferral of the Welfare Reform Bill’ (Sinn Féin, 4 October 2012) 
<http://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/24642> 
49 B Powys, ‘Benefit changes devastating – Welsh Minister Huw Lewis’ (BBC News, 1 April 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-21988839> 
50 TH Marshall, ‘Citizenship and social class’ in TH Marshall and T Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class 
(London: Pluto, 1992) 8 
51 D Nastic, ‘Why we need a relative income poverty measure’ (2012) 143 Poverty 13 
52 Department for Work and Pensions, Measuring child poverty (London: DWP, 2003) 10 
53 C Garroway and JR de Laiglesia, ‘On the relevance of relative poverty for developing countries’ (WP314, Issy-
les-Moulineaux: OECD Development Centre, 2012) 15 
54 TH Marshall, ‘The right to welfare’ in The right to welfare and other essays (London: Heinemann, 1981) 84, 
90 
55 Department for Work and Pensions and Department for Education, Child poverty in the UK: the report on the 
2010 target (London: HMSO, 2012) 
56 M Brewer, J Browne and R Joyce, Child and working age poverty from 2010 to 2020 (London: IFS, 2011) 
57 European Committee of Social Rights, European Social Charter: conclusions XX-2 (2013) (Great Britain) 
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2014) 18 
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indefensible as benefits fall further behind earnings. Income from social assistance should be “not 
manifestly below” 50 per cent of median income,58 but even before the current freeze on income 
replacement benefits a childless couple on jobseeker’s allowance could expect an income after 
housing costs no higher than 29 per cent of the equivalised median.59 
(a) Scotland 
A core element of Scottish elites’ critique of the coalition was that poverty reduction remained a 
higher priority in their region than among a London-centric UK elite. That Scotland is “more socialist” 
(several politicians) in its outlook than England is hardly a novel assertion. 60 Even if most studies 
conclude that the ideological gap is narrow at societal level,61 Scotland’s party political centre of 
gravity is unquestionably to the left of England’s and campaigners frequently portrayed 
independence as an opportunity to put (to use a phrase usually associated with Wales)62 “clear red 
water” between Scotland and the remainder of the UK.63 Scottish participants, while anxious not to 
overstate ideological differences with the north of England in particular, argued that “egalitarianism” 
(four interviewees), a concern for the “common weal” (politician) and an aspiration to “be a fairer 
country,” albeit in a way that is “not absolutely defined” (politician), are central to the Scottish 
psyche and to Holyrood politics in a way that does not apply at Westminster today. 
Whether this translates into a view that the state should be more generous in the standard of living 
it supports for citizens is less clear, at least where out-of-work benefits are concerned. Although 
there was near-universal agreement that the minimum wage was inadequate, there was no clear 
indication that out-of-work benefits would be higher if competence were devolved. Nor did any 
interviewee voice support for the Expert Working Group’s suggestion that an independent Scotland 
might move towards a more contributory, conservative model of social security, 64 which might be 
expected to be more generous towards the short term unemployed. This may in part reflect the 
timing of the interviews in the immediate aftermath of a command paper indicating that the rates of 
the main income replacement benefits would not be among the devolved social security 
competences.65 However, even in the current context of greater clarity that Scotland has the option 
                                                          
58 European Committee of Social Rights, European Social Charter: conclusions XX-2 (2013) (Great Britain) 
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59 Author’s calculation based on J Shale, K Balchin, J Rahman, R Reeve and M Rolin, Households below average 
income: an analysis of the income distribution 1994/95-2013/14 (London: DWP, 2015) 
60 See G Mooney and L Poole, ‘“A land of milk and honey”? Social policy in Scotland after devolution’ (2004) 
24(4) Critical Social Policy 458; N McEwen, ‘The territorial politics of social policy development in multilevel 
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2011); J Mitchell, The Scottish question (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 
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policies’ (2012) 28(3) Public Policy and Administration 306 
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justice’ (2015) 23(1) Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 5 
64 Expert Working Group on Welfare, Re-thinking welfare: fair, personal and simple (Edinburgh: Scottish 
Government, 2014) 
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of topping up reserved benefits,66 there are no proposals to use this power.67 Pressure to make top-
ups may increase if, as proposed, the former child poverty reduction duty is reinstated in Scotland:68 
despite emphasis from all tiers of government on employment as the best route out of poverty, 
progress towards the targets under New Labour was closely associated with increases in the real 
value of benefits.69  
Greater generosity has always been more likely in respect of housing-related benefits, which will 
come under Holyrood’s control.70 Following the Welfare Reform Act 2012 the Scottish government 
undertook to make good any reduction of social tenants’ housing benefit due to under-occupancy,71 
and it now states that no under-occupancy penalty will apply to them under universal credit.72 
Interviewees endorsed this approach on pragmatic grounds, under-occupation being relatively 
widespread in Scotland,73 and ideological grounds, with Scots claimed to be more inclined to view a 
social rental as a “home for life” (politician). There was widespread resistance to the introduction of 
PIP, which will see fewer individuals have any entitlement compared to disability living allowance 
and reduced payments for many others.74 Here, appetite for a Scotland-specific disability benefit – 
recommended by the Expert Working Group and hinted at in early Scottish government proposals75 
– was greater, with various interviewees suggesting this might widen eligibility, but not necessarily 
increase generosity at the individual level. However, current proposals are for administrative 
changes only, notably to the (re)assessment process, with no hint of radical change in eligibility 
criteria and higher payments proposed in respect of carer’s allowance only.76 Increased generosity is 
found in the Scottish welfare fund, which replaces the discretionary social fund’s crisis loans with 
non-repayable grants.77  
Social security devolution in Scotland is in its infancy. Already there are some – albeit few – 
indications that devolved areas of the system to will be more generous than their equivalents in 
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Scottish Government, 2016) 
73 K Gibb, The ‘bedroom tax’ in Scotland (SP paper 409, Edinburgh: Scottish Parliament, 2013) 
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Law Review 888 
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76 Scottish Government, A new future for social security: consultation on social security in Scotland (Edinburgh: 
Scottish Government, 2016) 
77 Welfare Funds (Scotland) Regulations 2016 no 107 
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: 
M Simpson, ‘Renegotiating social citizenship in the age of devolution’ (2017) 44(4) Journal of Law 
and Society 646 
It has been published in final form at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy1.athensams.net/doi/10.1111/jols.12061/full. This article may be 
used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-
Archiving. 
England and Wales. Unionist interviewees who argued that while in the run-up to the referendum 
nationalists were quick to imply benefits would be higher following independence, “at no point did 
they suggest that it was possible to have a higher budget for that area of policy” may feel their 
scepticism vindicated. An alternative perspective might hold, as civil servants argued, that it would 
be unrealistic to expect radical change immediately upon devolution. Important questions about 
budgeting,78 policy development, system oversight, interaction with reserved benefits79 and what 
the pledge to develop an approach underpinned by the principles of dignity and respect means in 
practice80 must be resolved before a genuinely Scottish model can emerge. Which point of view is 
closer to the truth will become clear over time. 
(b) Northern Ireland 
Social security has been devolved to Northern Ireland since 1921, in principle creating greater 
opportunity to develop a more distinctive approach than in Scotland even after the 2016 Act. 
However, policy since then has been characterised by a strict adherence to parity with Great Britain. 
While opportunities for radicalism have been tempered by economics and a politically disunited 
Executive capable of agreeing a “lowest common denominator” only on the basis of shared 
conservative social values and protection of the “unambiguously deserving poor,”81 recent rhetoric 
demands consideration of whether full autonomy would result in more generous provision. 
The story of Northern Ireland’s Welfare Reform Bill illustrates the difficulties associated with striking 
agreement within the consociational Executive. A critical committee report on a Bill authored to 
replicate the 2012 Act was followed by two years of negotiations on the extent of divergence 
affordable, apparent agreement on a package of mitigations and last-gasp defeat of the Bill at the 
final legislative stage.82 The mitigations proposed alongside the Welfare Reform (NI) Order 2015 and 
Welfare Reform and Work (NI) Order 2016,83 the vehicles by which the 2012 and 2016 reforms are 
being extended to the region, do suggest an ability to unite around protection of the 
“unambiguously deserving poor,”84 with an additional focus on victims of the conflict of the 1960s to 
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1990s and a dash of policy learning from Scotland.85 Hence, for a transitional period, there will be 
compensation for disabled people and carers who lose income; people with conflict-related 
disabilities ineligible for PIP; families with children affected by the household benefit cap; and social 
tenants affect by the size criteria.86  
Pragmatic reasons for more generous social security exist in Northern Ireland: with high levels of 
disability and economic inactivity, citizens and economy are more dependent on benefits than the 
UK average. With social tenants also disproportionately likely to under-occupy,87 the projected per 
capita economic impact of reforms up to 2013 was 23 per cent greater than the worst affected 
region in Great Britain.88 Not all interviewees depicted Northern Ireland as a ‘special case’: two 
politicians simply felt the opportunity presented by devolution to diverge from reform “that isn’t 
working in Britain” should not be passed up. However, most focused on the particular circumstances 
of the region in their critique of coalition policy, arguing that high energy costs, economic weakness 
following decades of conflict, a peripheral location and treatment as a “backwater” (politician) by 
successive UK administrations could only magnify the effect of benefit cuts. Even sceptics as to the 
merits of widespread divergence advocated some special treatment on the grounds of the legacy of 
the ‘troubles’, albeit that others considered that “20-odd years after the ceasefires… you must be a 
little bit less special than what you were” (politician). Ongoing social division in the post-conflict era 
was depicted as a decisive argument against the reduction of housing benefit for under-occupying 
social tenants, given that ethno-religious segregation in social housing further limits tenants’ ability 
to move to scarce smaller accommodation. On the other hand, a small number of civil servants 
suggested Northern Ireland’s circumstances justified “cutting back on benefits to encourage people 
into work” to a greater extent than in Great Britain, a single UK rate being more likely to “act as a 
drag for the labour market” in a region with below-average earnings. 
Ultimately, despite devolved competence for social security, Northern Ireland’s freedom to 
manoeuvre is constrained. Adherence to parity with Great Britain reflects not only the view that 
citizens of a single state ought to enjoy comparable social provision, which retained support among 
unionists and civil servants, but also fear of the budgetary impact of paying and administering more 
generous benefits. A recent Minister’s claim that the region is required to maintain parity in headline 
rates of benefits89 is legally questionable –the legislation states only that when the Secretary of State 
uprates benefits the Northern Ireland Minister “may make a corresponding order.”90 However, given 
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the controversy that surrounded the affordability of a limited set of mitigations, it can be assumed 
that the far costlier step of uprating benefits faster than in Great Britain would be politically 
difficult.91  
5. THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CITIZENSHIP: STRIKING 
THE RIGHT BALANCE 
One of the more controversial aspects of Marshall’s vision of social citizenship is the balance 
between the citizen’s right to support and reciprocal responsibilities to society. Marshall’s 
characterisation of financial support when required as a “moral right”92 has birthed the critique that 
his is no more than a “theory of entitlement,”93 yet it is far from clear that he advocates 
“unconditional entitlement to welfare.”94 Powell and Hewitt set Marshall, the supposed advocate of 
largely unconditional welfare services, against Beveridge, for whom entitlement should be primarily 
based on previous contribution and claimants must “use their time, so as to fit themselves or to 
keep themselves fit for service”95 – in today’s language, welfare-to-work. Yet Marshall speaks 
approvingly of Beveridge’s efforts to establish a “new social order” (albeit with certain “defects”)96 
and argues that the moral right to welfare can be satisfied by an appropriately administered 
discretionary safety net, even if a legal right is not strictly present.97 Similarly, the Marshallian model 
of citizenship includes a moral duty, although not necessarily a legal duty, to work as a 
“responsibility towards the welfare of the community.”98  
The UK state has never accepted an unconditional right to income, housing and other essentials 
(healthcare and education are perhaps exceptions). Paid employment is constructed as the “only 
route to social mobility and… the sole means of acquiring the status and rights of citizenship”99 by 
contributing to society.  Social citizenship becomes: 
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“an achievement rather than a status… Individuals do not and cannot have a right to the 
resources of society unless they contribute to the development of that society through 
work or other socially valued activities, if they are in a position to do so.”100 
The first Beveridgean manifestation of work-related reciprocity – contribution – has been lauded as 
the ideal basis for social security, yet seemingly in permanent decline, since before the foundation of 
the modern welfare state.101 The insurance principle retains advocates in the 21st century,102 yet its 
relevance to working age benefits continues to decrease.103 The second – efforts to enter or return 
to paid work – has become increasingly entrenched. 104 Unemployed claimants must participate in 
interventions – from interviews with an adviser to unpaid placements – to improve employment 
prospects,105 with non-compliance meaning exposure to financial sanctions that have been stiffened, 
to a maximum of three years’ loss of benefit, and whose use has escalated since 2007.106 The 
number of claimants excused from jobseeking conditionality on the basis of ill health, age or 
engagement in “other socially valued activities” has shrunk, with lone parents, recipients of 
incapacity benefits, people aged over 65 and carers increasingly drawn into the activation pool.  
Beveridge assumed married women would spend most of their time on the “vital work” of raising 
children and supporting their husbands, who in return would ensure their wives’ economic 
welfare.107 The priority afforded to caregiving was also reflected in lone parents’ unconditional 
eligibility for social assistance from the 1940s until the start of the 21st century108 and in the creation 
of a dedicated benefit for full-time carers for disabled people.109 Increasing emphasis on labour 
market engagement as the preferred basis of entitlement is embodied in the introduction of joint 
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claims for jobseeker’s allowance from 1999110 and the rapid change in the treatment of lone parents 
since 2007, with transfer to JSA mandated at a progressively earlier stage in their children’s lives (the 
third birthday following the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016). Since carer’s allowance is parasitic 
on disability benefits, the tightening of eligibility criteria inherent in PIP will result in fewer being 
eligible.111 Claimant activation has been a feature of incapacity-related benefits since the New 
Labour era. 112 Reduction of the benefit payable to employment and support allowance claimants in 
the work related activity group to a level equivalent to JSA113 further emphasises the expectation 
that they will return to paid employment relatively quickly, even though in practice the typical ESA 
claim lasts significantly longer than the typical JSA claim – 60 per cent of JSA claims last around six 
months, whereas 60 per cent of WRAG claimants remain in the group for two years.114 
(a) Rights and responsibilities in the devolved regions 
Legislators in Scotland and Northern Ireland have indicated dissatisfaction with the UK government’s 
approach to claimant conditionality. A number of provisions relating to sanctions are included in the 
‘mitigations’ proposed in Northern Ireland as it belatedly implements the reforms legislated for in 
Great Britain in 2012. Notably, the maximum period for which benefit may be withdrawn is capped 
at eighteen months, as opposed to 36 in Great Britain, and it is proposed that all sanctioned 
claimants should be referred to a dedicated helpline for advice on appeals, hardship payments and 
other matters.115 While Scotland’s new competences exclude claimant conditionality, 
parliamentarians have issued a critical report on the post-2012 regime,116 the Scottish Welfare Fund 
extends eligibility for crisis grants to sanctioned claimants, who were ineligible for the social fund,117 
and sanctions are being designed out of devolved employment support schemes.118 This raises the 
question of whether the disciplinary approach that increasingly characterises UK social security is in 
keeping with constructions of social citizenship in the devolved regions.  
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If there are doubts about the UK government’s methods, its objective of speeding the transition into 
and ensuring a financial reward for employment is endorsed at devolved level.119 Interview data 
show a broad consensus that “work is the best thing for people” (civil servant, Scotland) or “when 
somebody is out of work their job should be finding work” (civil servant, NI). Yet considerable 
differences of perspective emerge between Scotland and Northern Ireland, and there is a tendency 
for sympathy for individual claimants to sit alongside a more equivocal or supportive view of 
conditionality per se. 
Various Scottish interviewees portrayed the post-2012 conditionality regime as little more than a 
policy of vindictiveness against people the state has chosen to construct as “a drag on society” 
(politician). Even those taking the more charitable view that DWP “believe… if they make anything… 
less punitive you decrease the incentive to go to work, and ultimately that would be bad for the 
people themselves” (civil servant) tended to view policy as excessively harsh. Few suggested 
Scotland could or would operate a sanction-free unemployment benefit, but there was widespread 
agreement that penalties have become too severe and near-consensus that they are too readily 
imposed. Most politicians had a ‘horror story’ of a constituent who had been sanctioned for 
“spurious” reasons despite his or her best efforts to comply with conditions attached to a benefit. 
Examples included individuals who had missed appointments as a result of a genuine mistake or 
clash with a job interview, had not understood their obligations or had supplied insufficient 
documentary evidence of compliance. The implication was that there was nothing the claimant 
could have done to avoid the sanction, or that even if behaviour had been modified so as to avoid 
the sanction employment prospects would have been unaffected.120 Although one politician argued 
sanctions are necessary to force reluctant or disengaged claimants to engage with employment 
support, others were dismissive of the quality of this support.121  
Ultimately, jobseekers’ obligation to accept any job at any wage is at odds with most interviewees’ 
vision of Scotland as a society in which employment remains key to economic welfare and an 
important contribution to society,122 but where “fair work,” a living wage and job security are 
afforded higher priority. In place of a disciplinary UK welfare state whose aim is to “bully people into 
low paid work” (politician, Scotland), the dominant aspiration was to an enabling welfare state in 
which people are empowered and supported to enter rewarding employment. This vision for an 
enabling welfare state does not extend to enthusiasm for the market as a provider of welfare 
services – an element of New Labour’s model of the enabling state123 from which Scotland has 
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tended to distance itself.124 So the Welsh model of contracting out delivery of discretionary 
assistance, a civil servant suggested, was not “considered to be appropriate in Scotland.”  
Interviewees’ comments and some early proposals for devolved social security do align with other 
features of the enabling state.125 Social security devolution is itself an example of movement 
towards a localised state, but the Scottish government has gone further, devolving delivery of the 
Scottish welfare fund and (by necessity) mitigation of the social sector size criteria to local 
authorities. Even interviewees sceptical about social security devolution eagerly anticipated a key 
role for local government in the delivery of employment support, allowing greater responsiveness to 
local labour market needs. Devolution of employment support was also predicted to result in a move 
from a ‘new public management’ focus on short-term measures of success – getting people off 
benefits by any means,126 seen as DWP’s goal – to a ‘public value’ approach emphasising sustainable 
employment. A clear desire existed to move from crisis intervention to crisis prevention, with 
politicians generally supportive of a higher minimum wage and less use of in-work benefits 
(“subsidies for employers who treat people badly”), more state provision or subsidisation of 
childcare and fewer parents on income support.127 Participative democracy and coproduction of 
policy were not mentioned during fieldwork, but are among the principles for the development of 
Scottish social security announced in 2016.128 More broadly, the shift from silos to integration 
embodied in the 2007 transformation of the Scottish government to a single, non-departmental 
entity129 was viewed by civil servants as one factor facilitating a shared commitment across 
government to social justice. 
In Northern Ireland, there was greater buy-in to “the Iain Duncan Smith view of the world” (civil 
servant), that the social security system had been “having a negative impact in terms of… social 
inclusion” and that a more interventionist approach was required to promote employment. 
Although one civil servant argued that social security and employment support should be separated 
entirely – that “welfare’s about looking after people’s needs; getting them back to work is a different 
thing altogether” – this was a minority view. Indeed, the recent reorganisation of devolved 
government has brought the two functions within the remit of a single department (the Department 
for Communities), as in Great Britain (DWP). Most interviewees accepted that social protection 
should encourage, through coercion if necessary, labour market engagement. This could mean 
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keeping benefits low to motivate “people who don’t want to work [because] if they were to get a job 
it may not be of the same level that they’re getting on the welfare benefit system” (politician). 
Equally, it could mean “some kind of stick” (civil servant) to punish reluctant jobseekers. Even the 
coalition’s fiercest critics stressed: “There's no question of us countenancing people just sitting and 
not going to work and drawing on benefits” (politician). 
Nonetheless Northern Ireland’s conditionality regime will be less harsh than Great Britain’s – if only 
in the “symbolic” (civil servant) halving of the duration of the heaviest possible sanction, which most 
interviewees believed would seldom be imposed – and provision is being made to ensure access to 
advice services for sanctioned claimants. Perhaps more significantly, sanctions are much less used in 
Northern Ireland,130 which civil servants there and in Scotland believed was due to administration of 
the system by a regional Social Security Agency, insulated from political pressure within DWP to 
treat claimants harshly.131 So while interviewees in Northern Ireland were generally comfortable 
with the use of disciplinary measures to enforce jobseeking, there was widespread concern that in 
Great Britain the potential severity and application of sanctions had become “unjust” (civil servant), 
with the region’s approach representing a more proportionate model. 
As in Scotland, there was concern that the activities in which claimants are compelled to take part 
are less than helpful in aiding the transition to employment. In the context of a regional labour 
market relatively lacking in opportunity,132 it was suggested, “some reality needs to kick in” (civil 
servant) on the part of advisers who require claimants to spend many hours per week seeking for 
jobs that, in the view of a number of interviewees, simply do not exist. Indeed, prescriptive 
jobseeking agreements backed up with the threat of sanction were portrayed by some as 
undermining “the relationship that's built between the adviser and the customer” (civil servant)133 
and therefore prospects of transition to employment. With greater historic divergence in 
employment support than in social security, some civil servants proclaimed Northern Ireland’s 
activation schemes superior to DWP’s. However, an alternative perspective argued any approach 
that depends on private contractors will be compromised because “they’ll always cherry pick the 
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easy case… the whole thing will be gamed and we will not get to the hard core of long term 
unemployed who really need help” (civil servant).134 
6. WELFARE UNIONISM, NATIONALISM AND REGIONALISM: 
SITUATING RESPONSIBILITY FOR CITIZENS’ ECONOMIC WELFARE 
If the nation state was once readily accepted as the “‘natural’ location for citizenship,”135 today 
“scales of social solidarity are shifting, no longer exclusively based on the nation-state.”136 The 
monolithic UK welfare state, if it ever truly existed,137 is being replaced by one in which “social 
citizenship rights are… expressed at different territorial scales.”138  It is clear from interview data and 
political developments that elites in Northern Ireland and Scotland are uncomfortable with key 
aspects of recent UK government social security policy. In Scotland in particular, this discomfort 
appears to flow from a regional perspective on social citizenship that subtly, but genuinely, differs 
from that driving policy developments at Westminster. This Scottish vision is characterised by 
greater concern with poverty alleviation and a welfare-to-work model based on supporting, rather 
than coercing, claimants into employment. It is less clear that a Northern Irish ideology of social 
citizenship exists, but here, too, there are pragmatic concerns about the suitability of aspects of the 
UK approach and a view that cost-cutting and disciplinary measures have gone too far. However, 
dissatisfaction with how citizens’ social rights are evolving under DWP’s oversight is not necessarily a 
decisive argument for devolution of power to do things differently. Literature since 1998 suggests 
views on the appropriate locus of policy competence and the desirability of divergence are shaped 
as much by aspirations regarding the future of the political union.139  
Marshall is typically depicted as a welfare unionist, associating social citizenship with the nation 
state and therefore situating responsibility for the definition and realisation of its attendant rights 
with the national government.140 From this perspective, only a national, relatively uniform welfare 
state can assure the social rights of citizenship to “all citizens equally.”141 Certainly, Marshall’s 
egalitarian dream of converting the social “skyscraper” into a “bungalow”142 would be more 
                                                          
134 See J Rees, A Whitworth and E Carter, ‘Support for all in the UK work programme? Differential payments, 
same old problem…’ (WP115, Birmingham: Third Sector Research Centre, 2013) 
135 M Powell, ‘The hidden history of social citizenship’ (2002) 6(3) Citizenship Studies 229 
136 M Keating, The government of Scotland: public policy making after devolution (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2010) 42 
137 D Wincott, ‘Social citizenship and social policy: Britain’s welfare states’ (2006) 36(1) Publius 169 
138 G Lodge and A Trench, Devo more and welfare: devolving benefits and policy for a stronger union (London: 
IPPR, 2014) 10 
139 See G Lodge and A Trench, ‘Devo more and welfare: devolving benefits and policy for a stronger union’ 
(London: IPPR, 2014) 
140 G Mooney and C Williams, ‘Forging new “ways of life”? Social policy and nation building in devolved 
Scotland and Wales’ (2006) 26(3) Critical Social Policy 608; M Keating, ‘Social citizenship, solidarity and welfare 
in regionalised and plurinational states’ (2009) 13(5) Citizenship Studies 501 
141 I McLean, J Gallagher and G Lodge, Scotland’s choices: the referendum and what happens afterwards 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013) 107 
142 TH Marshall, ‘Citizenship and social class’ in TH Marshall and T Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class 
(London: Pluto, 1992) 28 
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: 
M Simpson, ‘Renegotiating social citizenship in the age of devolution’ (2017) 44(4) Journal of Law 
and Society 646 
It has been published in final form at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy1.athensams.net/doi/10.1111/jols.12061/full. This article may be 
used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-
Archiving. 
challenging in the context of significant regional differences in social entitlements or taxation. 
However, there is little evidence from Marshall’s writing of preoccupation with the question of 
which tier of government should be responsible for the social rights of citizenship. Northern Ireland’s 
devolved status goes unacknowledged in Citizenship and social class and Bottomore identifies failure 
to engage with the challenges posed to citizenship by separatist movements and strong sub-state 
identities as a key weakness of the Marshallian narrative.143 
The logic of Marshall’s teleology of citizenship, in which social citizenship flows from political 
citizenship, is that recent constitutional developments will undermine the primacy of the nation 
state in determining citizens’ social rights. Social rights remained limited until extension of the 
franchise to poorer sections of the population, whose exposure to social risk was greater, facilitated 
articulation of demands for healthcare, education, housing and social protection, which political 
candidates could no longer ignore.144 Similarly, regionalisation of political citizenship via legislative 
devolution facilitates the expression through the ballot box of differing perspectives at sub-state 
level as to the form citizens’ social rights should take. This in turn may lead to the emergence of 
distinctive regional welfare states to the extent that devolved competences permit – and social 
policy dominates the functions of the devolved institutions145 – or to demands for further devolution 
where the settlement cannot accommodate divergent ideologies of welfare or regional needs.  
Social security was largely immune to divergence before 2012, due to lack of devolved competence 
(Scotland and Wales) and the parity convention (Northern Ireland). In 2009, following the Calman 
Commission’s report,146 the UK government pronounced itself “deeply committed” to the 
maintenance of a single system.147 By 2012, under a new administration, it was breaking up national 
systems of discretionary welfare and council tax benefit in favour of local or regional 
replacements.148 In 2014, the leaders of the three main UK parties signed a ‘vow’ that further 
powers in fields including “welfare” would be devolved to Scotland if voters rejected 
independence149 and it should be no surprise if the renewed push for independence following the 
2016 EU referendum is met with further social security devolution.150 Positions have also shifted in 
Scotland: the 1995 constitutional convention recommended that competence should be reserved in 
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any devolution settlement.151 Fourteen years on this position had softened slightly, with Calman 
suggesting the UK government “explore” devolution of discretionary benefits.152 However, the Smith 
recommendation that housing benefit, welfare-to-work programmes and disability benefits should 
be devolved in full goes considerably further.153 Calman’s proposal that the Scottish government 
gain little more than a right to lobby UK Ministers on the former two and the latter remain reserved 
was never likely to match the appetite for further devolution of an electorate that had already 
handed power to the secessionist Scottish National Party and 45 per cent of whom would vote for 
independence in 2014. Meanwhile, in Northern Ireland, although parity has not always been 
absolute,154 2015 saw the most dramatic rupture with the principle in 90 years, with a Bill modelled 
on the Welfare Reform Act 2012 failing to complete its progress through the Assembly.155 An equally 
dramatic reversal would follow, with Westminster temporarily handed competence to extend its 
reforms of 2012 and 2016.156 While the mitigations being introduced at regional level are largely 
minor and temporary, 157 the shattering of the taboo that confined serious criticism of parity to back 
benchers is significant in itself, with Ministers and committee chairs openly voicing their concerns 
about coalition policy and disputing the region’s scope for divergence.158 
Rising demand for social security devolution following the electoral rise of the Scottish National 
Party and Sinn Féin from 2007 appears at first glance to fit the ‘welfare nationalism’ narrative of 
secessionist movements seeking to obtain a key trapping of nationhood for their regions. Interview 
data more closely resemble McEwen’s reverse perspective, in which dissatisfaction with the UK’s 
“retreat from the Keynesian welfare state” fuels nationalist sentiment,159 yet crucially the demand 
for greater autonomy was not limited to nationalist interviewees. Instead, welfare regionalism, a 
desire for a greater role for the region in determining the social rights of citizenship within the UK, 
emerges from political nationalists, (sometimes reluctantly) from unionists and very strongly from 
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Scottish civil servants; Northern Irish civil servants remain by far the strongest redoubt of welfare 
unionism.160  
The connection between welfare regionalism and political reaction to the coalition’s reforms means 
it is less clear that appetite for autonomy results from consideration of the best locus in principle of 
responsibility for income maintenance. This applies equally to the conversion of the Westminster 
elite to the devolutionist cause in 2014, which looks less the outcome of principled forward planning 
than a panicked response to a late poll suggesting Scotland might vote for independence.161 
Subsequent negotiations on a new devolution settlement were similarly portrayed by interviewees 
as unconcerned with the most logical or effective division of powers, but fixated on point-scoring in 
favour of a unionist or nationalist perspective. The Smith Commission’s deliberations were dismissed 
as “folk… putting stuff on the table and off the table in a pretty random and haphazard way” 
(politician), its report as a “cobbled together mixed bag” (politician), not “based on fundamental 
constitutional principles” (civil servant), but the outcome of “political negotiations” (civil servant) 
and “horse trading” (politician). Nationalist interviewees claimed unionists sought to preserve a 
centralised welfare state as “the glue that holds the UK together,” regardless of Scotland’s best 
interests. Unionists believed nationalists, having lost the referendum, sought to “push for everything 
up to and including independence” by maximising devolved competences, whether or not they had 
any firm idea how they might use these powers.  
Northern Ireland had no comparable constitutional moment to the Scottish referendum and Smith 
Commission, but the significance of the near-tearing up of the 90-year-old parity convention should 
not be underestimated. The question of how to react to a 2012 Act heavily criticised by all major 
regional parties was complicated by the fact that, as civil servants observed, it was not one Stormont 
had previously been required to ask itself. Early, anti-devolution Unionist governments’ “desire to 
treat [everybody] in the matter of legislation and benefit, precisely on the same level as similar 
people are treated in [Great Britain],”162 was subsidised by the UK government from 1926.163 The 
extent of this subvention remains the most significant obstacle to divergence; prior to 2012, even 
Ministers critical of Westminster policy treated preservation of the parity relationship and its 
financial transfers as the highest priority in social security.164 Consequently, civil servant 
interviewees were concerned that politicians were advocating divergence from Great Britain without 
due consideration of “the consequences of making those statements in terms of the budget 
position.” Indeed, the last-ditch swerve back towards parity appears to be primarily due to the 
feared budgetary implications of persistence with the costlier pre-2012 system.165  
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The key lesson from Northern Ireland’s experience of social security devolution, then, is that 
devolved competences and dissatisfaction with the Westminster agenda do not necessarily result in 
legislative divergence. Responsibility for citizens’ economic welfare appears to rest with the 
Assembly, but if the Assembly does nothing more than replicate Westminster legislation and the 
Executive receives money from the Treasury for its implementation, this may be an illusion. Scotland 
had already shown some appetite for divergence prior to 2016, using discretionary housing 
payments to compensate housing benefit claimants affected by the social sector size criteria and 
offering some increased generosity in the Scottish Welfare Fund compared to the discretionary 
social fund. Holyrood’s new powers are more limited than Stormont’s, but if greater political unity 
around a clearer ideology of social citizenship can override the inevitable budgetary challenges 
associated with steering a distinctive course, it may over time become possible to speak of a Scottish 
model of social security. When the limited mitigations and more critical attitude to parity in 
Northern Ireland are added to the mix, it is clear that small steps are being taken towards a situation 
where “welfare is no longer reserved or devolved, it's a shared set of responsibilities” (civil servant, 
Scotland). A challenge for actors at all tiers of government in the coming period may be to find a 
more constructive way of discharging that shared responsibility than the two years of “fighting” 
(politician, NI) reported to have occurred between Northern Irish and UK Ministers following the 
Welfare Reform Act 2012 and the mystifying refusal of the UK government to extend the remit of 
the Social Security Advisory Committee to include oversight of devolved functions in Scotland.166 
Scottish policymakers face the additional question of how their vision of an enabling welfare-to-
work regime and a social security system based on dignity and respect can be realised when the 
minimum wage, rates of universal credit and conditionality regime remain reserved. 
CONCLUSION: SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN A CHANGING UK 
Social citizenship is in a state of flux both politically and theoretically. That the coalition government 
of 2010 to 2015 deliberately set about recasting social citizenship in the UK is not in doubt. Its 
impact on the welfare state was dramatic. In social security, fundamental to citizens’ ability to enjoy 
a normal lifestyle, the coalition reshaped the minimum standard of living the state guarantees 
through an “unprecedented” reduction of the real value of benefits.167 It also intensified the 
obligations of jobseekers, increasing the price of non-compliance, and (furthering a New Labour 
agenda) moving increasing numbers of claimants into the activation pool, diminishing the role of 
illness and caregiving as alternative constructors of desert. In both cases the coalition agenda has 
been taken further by the current Conservative government – freed from the moderating influence 
the Liberal Democrats exercised in some areas168 – with further benefit cuts and expansion of the 
definition of a jobseeker. Reducing the living standards of the non-employed and low-paid is clearly 
in tension with Marshall’s view that the social rights of citizenship are, at heart, aimed at ensuring 
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each citizen can enjoy a “civilised” existence according to current standards.169 . Reciprocity and a 
duty to work are not wholly alien to the Marshallian perspective, but an increasingly disciplinary 
social security system is at odds with some interpretations of Marshall as an advocate of relatively 
unconditional welfare rights. Perhaps, then, it is possible to argue that those parts of the welfare 
state in DWP’s hands are waving a “long goodbye” to Marshall.170  
On the other hand, in 2010 there was no evidence that the coalition desired far-reaching change to 
the tier of government responsible for citizens’ economic welfare. Events in Scotland largely forced 
this upon Westminster, and perhaps fed into Northern Ireland’s increased willingness to question 
the merits of parity. A common system may be justified as a necessary element of an equal 
citizenship or means of inter-territorial redistribution, but since 2012 devolved-level dissatisfaction 
with UK government policy has at times appeared to trump these considerations. Pressure for 
regionalisation does not emerge from consideration of the tier of government best placed to 
determine and guarantee the social rights of citizenship, but from the view that coalition policy was 
too miserly and/or punitive for regional circumstances or ideological preferences. Interview data and 
policy announcements suggest that Marshall’s vision of a welfare state that underpins a civilised 
standard of living and takes a less disciplinary stance towards claimants remains alive and well 
among Scottish elites at least. Northern Irish interviewees, lacking ideological cohesion, tend to 
foreground more pragmatic grounds for divergence; although these have largely been overridden by 
budgetary concerns for now, findings point to a need for a new inquiry into the merits of parity that 
is not reactive to a specific piece of UK legislation.  
Politically, this requires the UK government to decide whether it still aspires to relative uniformity of 
social protection and, if so, devise a more collegiate means of achieving this in cooperation with 
devolved administrations it can no longer dictate to. Theoretically, decentralised social security 
competences and regionalisation of the welfare state challenge mainstream interpretations of 
Marshall as a welfare unionist, but are shown here to be relatively compatible with his theory of 
citizenship. While tensions between decentralisation and hopes of an equal citizenship are 
acknowledged, progression from legislative devolution to divergence in social rights reinforces 
Marshall’s account of social citizenship as emerging from the exercise of political rights. The fall-out 
from the Brexit vote confirms that neither the constitutional nor the social policy journey has 
reached the end of the road; Marshall’s framework remains a useful basis for explaining the 
relationship between the two. 
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